The goal of this paper is to develop, axiomatically, a revealed preference theory of reference-dependent choice behavior. Instead of taking the "reference"for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem, we suitably relax the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference to obtain, endogeneously, the existence of reference alternatives as well as the structure of choice behavior conditional on those alternatives. We also elaborate on how to make welfare evaluations on the basis of the resulting individual decision-making model, and introduce the notion of "cumulative reference." JEL Classi…cation: D11, D81.
Introduction

Motivation
The canonical model of rational choice maintains that (i) an individual has a well-de…ned manner of ranking alternatives according to their desirability (independently of any particular choice problem that she might face), and (ii) among any collection of feasible alternatives, she chooses the item that she ranks the highest. Despite its various advantages, among which are its unifying structure, universal applicability, tractability, and predictive abilities, this model has long been scrutinized on the basis of its descriptive weaknesses. Indeed, various experimental and market evidence point persistently to certain types of choice behavior that are inconsistent with the premises of rational choice theory -it appears that human decision processes are often more intricate than this theory allows for. In particular, the consensus now seems to be that the presence of certain types of (observable) choice prospects -status quo choices, endowments, default options, etc. -may substantially a¤ect individual choice behavior.
1 Perhaps more surprisingly, there is now good evidence that suggests that reference dependence may feature in the choice behavior of a decision maker even in the case of choice situations in which no alternative is predesignated as a reference option. In certain contexts, it is observed that a seemingly ordinary feasible choice item may, for some reason or another, act as a reference for a decision-maker, thereby a¤ecting her choice behavior. While the behavior of the agent may seem to an outsider hard to "justify," she may actually be acting in a predictable manner relative to her subjectively determined (hence unobservable) reference point. In light of this evidence, the main objective of this paper is to modify the classical rational choice theory in a way to account for choice behavior that may depend on such situations.
Among the instances of reference-dependent behavior in contexts where a reference point is not exogeneously identi…ed, one that has received considerable attention in the literature is the famous attraction e¤ect phenomenon (also known as the asymmetric dominance e¤ect). Discovered …rst by Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) , and then corroborated in numerous studies both in psychology and marketing, this e¤ect may be described as the phenomenon in which, given a choice set of two feasible alternatives, the addition of a third alternative that is clearly inferior to one of the existing alternatives (but not to the other) may induce a shift of preference towards the item that dominates the new alternative. To illustrate, consider two alternatives, x and y; in a world in which each alternative is characterized by exactly two attributes (such as price and quality). Suppose, as shown in Figure 1 , y is better (resp., worse) than x relative to the …rst (resp., second) attribute. Suppose also that the agent chooses y when only x and y are available. Now suppose a third (decoy) alternative z becomes available to the agent; this alternative is inferior to x relative to both attributes, 1 The experimental and market literature that documents violations of the standard rationality paradigm is too extensive to be discussed here: see Camerer (1995) and Rabin (1998) for surveys. Among the many documented violations, the status quo bias phenomenon has, in particular, received quite a bit of attention in the literature. Among the individual choice models that are developed to represent this phenomenon are those that are based on loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman (1991) ), multi-utility (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and Sagi (2006) ), and multiple priors (Ortoleva (2010) but it is still better than y with respect to the …rst attribute ( Figure 1 ). The attraction e¤ect phenomenon corresponds to the situation in which the agent chooses x from the set fx; y; zg, which violates the standard formulation of rationality. The idea is that, somehow, the asymmetrically dominated alternative z acts as a reference for the agent in the problem fx; y; zg, making the choice prospect that is unambiguously better than z, namely x; more attractive than it actually is in the absence of z.
2;3
Given the amount of evidence on the presence of the attraction e¤ect, and its obvious importance for marketing, it seems desirable to provide a universally applicable model of 2 To hint at the potential consequences of the attraction e¤ect in the market place, let us mention the …ndings of Doyle et al. (1999) whose …eld experiments took place in a local grocery store. First, the authors recorded the weekly sales of the Brands X (the store's own brand, Spar (420 g) baked beans) and Y (Heinz (420 g) baked beans) in the grocery store under study, and observed that Brand X had gotten 19% of the sales in a given week, and Y the rest, even though Brand X was cheaper. Doyle et al. then introduced a third Brand Z (Spar (220 g) baked beans) to the supermarket, which was identical to Brand X in all attributes (including the price) except that the size of Brand Z was visibly smaller. Of course, the idea here is that Brand Z was asymmetrically dominated; it was dominated by X but not by Y. In accordance with the attraction e¤ect, the authors observed in the following week that the sales of Brand X had increased to 33% (while, of course, nobody had bought Brand Z). 3 The attraction e¤ect is demonstrated in the contexts of choice over political candidates (Pan, O'Curry and Pitts (1995) ), choice over risky alternatives (Wedell (1991) and Herne (1997) ), medical decision-making (Schwartz and Chapman (1999) and Redelmeier and Sha…r (1995) ), investment decisions (Schwarzkopf (2003) ), job candidate evaluation (Highhouse (1996) , Slaughter, Sinar and Highhouse (1999) , and Slaughter (2007) ), and contingent evaluation of environmental goods (Bateman, Munro and Poe (2008) ). While most of the experimental …ndings in this area are through questionnaire studies, some authors have con…rmed the attraction e¤ect also through experiments with incentives (Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Herne (1999) ).
In the psychological literature, it is argued that the attraction e¤ect may be due to simplifying decision heuristics (Wedell (1991) ), or due to one's need to justify his/her decisions (Simonson (1989) , and Simonson and Nowlis (2000) ), or due to the ambiguity of the information about the attributes of products (Ratneshwar, Shocker and Stewart (1987) and Mishra, Umesh and Stem (1993) ), or due to the comparative evaluation of goods (Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Bhargava, Kim and Srivastava (2000) ), or dynamic formation of preferences in a dominance-seeking manner (Ariely and Wallsten (1995) ), or evolutionary pressures (Sha…r, Waite and Smith (2002) ). In the marketing literature see, inter alia, Burton and Zinkhan (1987) , Lehmann and Pan (1994) , Sivakumar and Cherian (1995) , Sen (1998) , Kivetz (1999) , and Doyle, O'Connor, Reynolds and Bottomley (1999) .
individual decision-making that incorporates this phenomenon. For instance, to study the optimal choices of a monopolist (or an oligopolist) who wishes to exploit the attraction e¤ect in a market environment, and hence to assess the implications of this phenomenon for market segmentation, one would need to utilize this sort of a model. Similarly, to examine the potential implications of this phenomenon for the determination of political candidates and platforms, presentation of portfolios, etc., one needs a general model of individual choice which allows for the presence of this e¤ect. In a nutshell, the primary goal of the present paper is to develop a model of reference-dependent choice model that is suitable for this purpose, and one that deviates from the standard rational choice model in a parsimonious manner. 4
Overview
The primitives of our construction are identical to the classical choice theory, namely, a collection of feasible sets of alternatives (choice problems), and a choice correspondence de…ned on this collection. 5 We study choice correspondences that violate the classical formulation of rationality, namely, the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), but we focus only on those violations that could be ascribed to the presence of a certain form of (endogenous) reference e¤ect. To this end, we …rst introduce some terminology to classify the violations of WARP (Section 2.2.1). More important, we develop a method which extends that of the classical theory of revealed preference to allow not only for revealed preferences, but also for revealed references (Section 2.2.2). Put di¤erently, this method aims at identifying from one's (observable) choice behavior those choice items that may act as (unobservable) reference points for her in some choice situations as well as one's preference relation that represents her tastes at large.
6
Our main contribution is the derivation of a reference-dependent choice model on the basis of (falsi…able) behavioral postulates (Sections 2.3 and 3.1). This model can be described as follows. The decision-maker has a utility function over alternatives, a reference map r that maps any given feasible set S to either nothing or a reference alternative r(S) in that set, and an attraction correspondence Q that maps any given alternative z to those prospects the agent 4 There are a few recent studies that investigate the modeling of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon. For instance, Lombardi (2009 ), Gerasimou (2010 and de Clippel and Eliaz (2011) have characterized three di¤erent choice models that incorporate this phenomenon to some extent, and Kamenica (2008) has studied the issue by means of an information-based choice model in a particular market environment. However, as we shall discuss at length in Section 5.3, the three former models capture only a special case of the attraction phenomenon, while the latter work does not provide a general model of choice that is applicable outside of certain market contexts. 5 In contrast with the experimental literature discussed before, our model does not prescribe an alternative in terms of a given set of attributes: while the exogeneous description of a given alternative might include such attributes, it might also not contain any. (For example, the alternatives could simply be described as objects such as "ice cream," "luxury car A," "presidential candidate B," and so on.) In fact, we will derive in this paper the standard "multi-attribute" choice model as a consequence of behavioral postulates. 6 Needless to say, "reference dependence" is a multifarious concept. A "reference" may take the form of one's unattainable aspiration, or one that is attainable but is desirable only according to a social norm. By contrast, the notion of "reference" that we focus on here relates to undesirable choice prospects that, when attainable, alter the decision maker's views about the relative appeal of other feasible choice options. This view point will be clari…ed in Section 2. Figure 2 is attracted to from the perspective of z (acting as a reference point). When the agent does not single out a reference alternative in a given choice problem S -we denote this situation by writing r(S) = } -her behavior is entirely standard: she chooses any one alternative in S that maximizes her utility function. On the other hand, if she identi…es a reference item in S -in this case we have r(S) 2 S -rather than maximizing her utility function over the entire S, she focuses on those members of S which the presence of r(S) "attracts" her to. Put di¤erently, once r(S) is determined as her reference point, the decision-maker concentrates only on those outcomes in S that belong to the mental attraction region Q(r(S)) generated by that alternative. That is, in this case, she views her choice problem e¤ectively not as S; but S \ Q(r(S)): Under this psychological constraint, however, she acts fully rationally, that is, she …nalizes her choice by maximizing her utility function over S \ Q(r(S)):
This is a (boundedly rational) reference-dependent choice model that allows for the presence of the attraction e¤ect. The choice behavior exhibited in Figure 1 is, for instance, duly consistent with this model. Speci…cally, the model would "explain" this behavior by saying that it is "as if"the agent views z as a reference point in fx; y; zg; and the attraction region Q(z) includes x but not y: So, in the problem fx; yg; where there is no alternative to "use" as a reference for the agent to contrast x and y, the choice is y (as the utility of y exceeds that of x). But when faced with the problem fx; y; zg; the agent reduces this problem in her mind to fx; y; zg \ Q(z) = fx; zg; and consequently, chooses x: (See Figure 2. )
We also show how to impose further discipline to our representation by endowing the attraction correspondence Q with some structure (Section 3.3). Put precisely, we show what sort of behavior would allow us to think as if the agent were endowed not only with one utility function, but with several of them. (For example, each of these utilities could represent one of the attributes of the goods under consideration.) In the absence of a reference point the agent maximizes some aggregation of these utilities. When she discerns a reference option, however, she focuses only on those options that are superior to this option with respect to each of her utilities. (That is, the attraction region Q(x) of x is found as the set of those options that dominate x in terms of all utility functions.) This way we obtain a representation which embodies the spirit of the attraction e¤ect, but one in which the attributes of the choice prospects are determined endogeneously by the behavior of the agent. Subsequently, after the formal presentation of the underlying behavioral postulates and our choice model, we discuss how one may carry out a welfare analysis in terms of this model (Section 4), and investigate some potential applications and shortcomings of it thereof (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Finally, we discuss the related literature (Section 5.3) and conclude with the presentation of the proofs that are omitted in the main body of the text (Appendix).
2 Reference-Dependent Choice
Preliminaries
In what follows we work with an arbitrarily …xed separable metric space X, which we think of as the universal set of available alternatives. (For concreteness, the reader may view X as an arbitrary (nonempty) …nite set or a subset of a Euclidean space.) We let X stand for the set of all nonempty compact subsets of X. The elements of X are viewed as feasible sets that a decision-maker may need to choose an alternative from; they are henceforth referred to as choice problems.
A set-valued map c : X X is said to be a choice correspondence on X if ; 6 = c(S) S for every S 2 X: (If c is single-valued, we consider it as a function from X into X, and refer to it as a choice function on X:) 7 We say that this correspondence is continuous if for any two convergent sequences (x m ) and (y m ) in X; we have lim x m 2 cflim x m ; lim y m g provided that x m 2 c fx m ; y m g for each m. Our subsequent characterization results will focus on continuous choice correspondences on X. Clearly, when X is …nite, every choice correspondence on X is continuous, so doing this does not cause loss of generality.
Some Foundations for Reference-Dependent Choice
Violations of WARP
The classical assumption of rational choice theory is the so-called Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. Following the formulation of Arrow (1959) , who has actually referred to this property as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, we state this property as follows:
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). For every S 2 X and T S with c(S)\T 6 = ;; we have c(S) \ T = c(T ).
The fundamental theorem of revealed preference says that for any choice correspondence c on X that satis…es WARP there exists a complete preorder (that is, a complete and transitive binary relation) on X such that, for any S 2 X, the choices from S are the maximum elements in S according to that preorder. This result is usually viewed as a foundation for rational choice theory, for it maintains that, as long as one's choices do not violate WARP, they can be modeled "as if"they stem from the maximization of a complete preference relation.
To generalize the classical choice theory to allow for endogenous reference dependence, therefore, one has to relax WARP. To this end, we …rst give a name to those choice problems on which the choice behavior of the agent is observed to violate WARP.
De…nition. Let c be a choice correspondence on X: For any given S 2 X, we say that S is c-awkward if there is a pair of distinct alternatives (x; y) 2 c(S) S such that either (i) fyg = cfx; yg or (ii) y = 2 c(S) and fx; yg = cfx; yg:
In words, we say that a choice problem S is "awkward" if the choice behavior of the decision-maker in the context of S is not compatible with how she ranks alternatives in pairwise comparisons. This happens when either (i) the agent chooses an alternative x from S which is revealed to be less desirable than another alternative y in S when she compares these alternatives in isolation, or (ii) the agent deems two alternatives x and y equally desirable when she compares them against each other, even though she reveals a strict preference for x over y in the context of S. (Clearly, if c is a choice function, then S is c-awkward i¤ there are two alternatives x and y in S such that x = c(S) and y = cfx; yg:)
Revealed References
By far the most forthcoming arguments against WARP are based on the tendency of decisionmakers to form their choices by using certain alternatives in a feasible set as a references. For instance, the violation of WARP in the case of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon appears precisely due to such reference-dependent decision making. To study such violations systematically, we now introduce two notions that will help deducing the presence and the role of reference alternatives (if any) from one's choice behavior. (This is reminiscent of how one deduces the preferences of a decision-maker from her choice behavior in revealed preference theory.)
Consider a pair of alternatives x and z in X, and suppose there is some y 2 X such that x is not chosen over y in the pairwise context (that is, fyg = cfx; yg), but x is deemed choosable in the problem fx; y; zg (that is, x 2 cfx; y; zg). In other words, x alone is not able to "beat"y; but it does so with the "help"of z: Similarly, if y is deemed choosable from fx; yg (that is, y 2 cfx; yg) while x; but not y; is deemed choosable from fx; y; zg (that is fx; yg \ cfx; y; zg = fxg), it would be reasonable to conclude that the appeal of x against y is somewhat "enhanced" when z is also present in the choice problem. This leads us to the following de…nition:
De…nition. Let c be a choice correspondence on X and x; z 2 X: We say that z is a revealed reference for x relative to c (or more simply, a revealed c-reference for x) if there is an alternative y 2 X such that either (i) x 2 cfx; y; zgncfx; yg or (ii) y 2 cfx; yg and fx; yg \ cfx; y; zg = fxg:
In the case of a choice function c, this de…nition says simply that z is a revealed creference for x i¤ x = cfx; y; zg and y = cfx; yg for some y 2 X:
Potential References
The notion of revealed reference is demanding, for it requires that there be a choice problem from which one element is actually shown to "help"the other to be chosen. We would like to have a weaker notion according to which the introduction of some alternative z in a feasible set does not "reduce the appeal of x" even though it may not ensure x to be chosen. It is as if z does not really "help"x; but it does not "help"anything else against x either. That is to say, if x is chosen against some y when z was not present, then x must continue to be chosen when z is added to fx; yg; unless z is the unique choice in the new choice problem. Similarly, if y is not chosen against x, then the addition of z should not render y choosable against x. If this is the case, we say that z is a potential reference for x. More precisely:
De…nition. Let c be a choice correspondence on X and x; z 2 X: We say that z is a potential reference for x relative to c (or more simply, a potential c-reference for x) if, for every y 2 X such that c fx; y; zg 6 = fzg,
x 2 c fx; yg implies x 2 c fx; y; zg and y = 2 c fx; yg implies y = 2 c fx; y; zg :
Once again this de…nition simpli…es considerably in the context of choice functions; in that case, z is a potential c-reference for x i¤ x = cfx; yg and z 6 = cfx; y; zg imply x = cfx; y; zg for every y 2 X:
We emphasize that the notion of potential reference is a fairly weak one. For example, for a rational decision maker (that is, when c satis…es WARP), z is a potential c-reference for x; for any x; z 2 X. On the other hand, for such a choice correspondence c; no element of X quali…es as a revealed c-reference for any alternative in X:
Behavioral Foundations
Here we outline the axiomatic structure of the present analysis. Our …rst postulate is basic. Recall that our goal here is not to investigate violations of WARP in general, but rather to study those that are due to endogenous reference e¤ects. Consequently, we wish to model those decision-makers who act rationally in the traditional sense in the absence of referential considerations. In particular, as there could be no such e¤ects in pairwise choice situations -in such problems there is no room for a third alternative to 'help'another -we would like to posit the following property:
No-Cycle Condition (No-Cycle). For every x; y; z 2 X, if x 2 c fx; yg and y 2 c fy; zg ; then x 2 c fx; zg.
No-Cycle separates our analysis from that of most of the literature on violations of WARP, where the presence of cycles from sets of two elements is an essential component of the analysis. (See Section 5.3 for more on this.)
We next turn to restrict the way reference e¤ects can take place by connecting the notions of revealed and potential reference. In particular, we posit that if z is a revealed reference for x; that is, z is shown to actually "help"x be chosen in some situation, then z must also be a potential reference for x, that is, z cannot "help" another element against x in some other situation. This is asking for coherence of the evaluation of choice items by using a reference alternative.
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Reference Coherence (RCoh). For every x; z 2 X, if z is a revealed c-reference for x, then z is a potential c-reference for x.
We now come to our most important postulate, Reference Consistency. To formulate this property, we recall that a collection T of subsets of a set S is said to be a cover of S if the union of the members of T equals S; that is, S fT : T 2 T g = S: (Notice that T is not necessarily a partition of S; its members are allowed to overlap.) In turn, given a choice correspondence c on X, and a choice problem S 2 X, we say that a collection T of subsets of S is a c-cover of S if T is a cover of S such that each member of T contains at least one choice from S with respect to c; that is, c(S) \ T 6 = ; for each T 2 T : Loosely speaking, our next postulate states that, for a c-awkward choice problem S; WARP should hold for at least one member of any given c-cover of S.
Reference Consistency (RCon). For any c-awkward S 2 X and c-cover T of S, we have
RCon is a form of restriction on the kinds of violations of WARP we allow for. While it may not be evident at …rst stroke, this property is actually quite reasonable to impose on choice behavior that departs from rationality only due to reference-dependence. To see this, consider a decision-maker (with choice correspondence c) who acts in a reference-dependent manner in the context of some choice problem S. Let fA; Bg be a c-cover of S: Since A [ B = S, the reference point that the agent uses in S must belong to either A or B (or both). Suppose it belongs to A. Then A contains both the reference point used in S and at least one of the choices of the agent from S (because c(S) \ A 6 = ;). Therefore, it stands to reason that the reference point should retain its power in this smaller set A, and lead the agent once again to those choices (from S) that are still available in A, that is, c(A) = c(S) \ A. This is the very gist of RCon. Our …nal axiom looks at the situation of indi¤erence, and is required only if we focus on choice correspondences, and not on choice functions. Consider the case in which fx; yg c(S) for some S 2 X. This could happen in two ways. The …rst is when the agent is actually indi¤erent between x and y, that is, when fx; yg = cfx; yg. The second is when the agent prefers one of the two elements to the other, say x to y, but there is some third element in S which leads the agent to choose y as well. That is, in this latter case the reference e¤ect acts by increasing the appeal of y "just enough" to make it indi¤erent to x. The next postulate rules out this case, thereby imposing that reference e¤ects occur in a procedural mannereither they come into play, leading the agent to choose one option, or they do not, and the agent chooses the same option she would choose from doubletons.
Rationality of Indi¤erence (RI).
For every x; y 2 X, if fx; yg c(S) for some S 2 X, then fx; yg = cfx; yg.
We conclude this section by noting that every one of the axioms we have introduced above corresponds to a weakening of WARP. Indeed, while No-Cycle, RCon and RI are trivially weaker than WARP, the RCoh property is weaker than WARP because, when c satis…es WARP, there does not exist an alternative than can act as a revealed c-reference.
Remark. The four behavioral postulates we have formulated above constitute a logically independent set of axioms. This is proved in the Appendix.
Two Examples
We have argued above that our axiomatic framework is weaker than that allowed in the standard choice theory that is based on WARP. In particular, this framework lets one model reference-dependent behavior that pertains to the attraction e¤ect, as we illustrate next. Example 1. (Choice with attraction e¤ect) Let X := fx; y; zg; and consider the choice function c on 2 X nf;g depicted below:
cfx; yg = x; cfx; zg = x; cfy; zg = y and cfx; y; zg = y:
Obviously, this choice behavior is in violation of WARP -the alternative y is not revealed preferred to x even though it is deemed to be the choice from fx; y; zg: (Thus fx; y; zg is cawkward.) This is the typical behavior of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon. The alternative x emerges as the best alternative with respect to pairwise comparisons, but presumably because z acts as a reference that "attracts"the attention of the individual to y when these two alternatives are both feasible, the agent chooses y from the set fx; y; zg: It is easily checked that this behavior is consistent with all four of the axioms we considered above; we …nd here that z is a revealed c-reference for y:
At the other end, one may be worried that the discipline of our axiomatic model is perhaps too lax, thereby leaving us with a theory with little predictive power. It is indeed not transparent what sort of behavior is ruled out by the conjunction of the behavioral postulates of Section 2.3. This will be best understood through the representation theorems we present in the next section, but if only to give an idea about this, and illustrate how these axioms work together, we present next an example of a choice correspondence that is ruled out by the properties of No-Cycle and RCon.
Example 2. (Choice that is not rationalized by reference-dependence) Let X := fw; x; y; zg; and consider a choice correspondence c on 2 X nf;g such that cfx; yg 3 x; cfx; y; zg = fzg; cfw; x; yg = fyg and c(X) = fwg:
Then, c is ruled out by the present axiomatic model. To see this, suppose c satis…es No-Cycle and RCon. As ffw; yg; fx; ygg is a c-cover of fw; x; yg and fyg 6 = cfx; yg; RCon entails that fyg = cfw; yg. Similarly, as ffw; x; yg; fw; zgg is a c-cover of X and fwg 6 = cfw; x; yg; we have fwg = cfw; zg: It then follows from No-Cycle that fxg = cfx; zg: Combining this observation with the fact that ffx; zg; fy; zgg is a c-cover of fx; y; zg, RCon entails that either fzg = cfy; zg: It follows that we have fzg = cfy; zg; fwg = cfw; zg and fyg = cfw; yg; contradicting No-Cycle.
Representation Theorems
The Reference-Dependent Choice Model
Our objective now is to provide a representation for choice correspondences that satisfy the four behavioral properties we have considered above. The following auxiliary de…nition is useful for streamlining the presentation.
De…nition. A function r: X ! X [ f}g is said to be a reference map on X if, for any S 2 X; we have r(S) 2 S whenever r(S) 6 = }; and r(S) = } whenever jSj 2.
The following is our …rst main result. 
for every S 2 X; and
for every S; T 2 X with r(S) 2 T S and arg max u(S \ Q(r(S))) \ T 6 = ;.
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10 Notation. For any nonempty sets S and X such that S X; and real-valued function f on X; by arg max f (S); we mean the set of all maximizers of f on S; that is, fx 2 S :
In what follows, we refer to any triplet hu; r; Qi in which u is a continuous real map on X; r is a reference map on X, and Q : X [ f}g X is a correspondence such that Q (}) = X and (2) holds (for every S; T 2 X with r(S) 2 T S and arg max u(S \ Q(r(S))) \ T 6 = ;), as a reference-dependent choice model on X. In the context of such a model, we call u the utility function, r the reference map, and Q the attraction correspondence of the model. Finally, if (1) holds for some choice correspondence c on X, we say that hu; r; Qi represents c:
In this jargon, Theorem 1 says that a continuous choice correspondence on X satis…es the four behavioral properties of Section 2.3 i¤ it can be represented by a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi on X: Here, u is interpreted as a standard utility function for the decision-maker, free of any referential considerations. In turn, the reference map r tells us whether the agent uses a reference point in a given choice problem S or not. In the former case, r(S) stands for the reference alternative in S: By de…nition of a reference map, such a reference alternative must itself be a feasible alternative in S; that is, r(S) 2 S: The latter case, that is, the case where the agent does not discern a reference item in S; is captured by the statement r(S) = }: Again by de…nition of a reference map, this situation is sure to occur when S contains at most two alternatives, for then, as we have noted earlier, there is no room for an alternative to change the comparative evaluation of two other choice items.
For any ! 2 X [ f}g; we interpret the set Q(!) as the attraction region of !; this corresponds to the set of all alternatives in X that "look better"to the decision-maker when compared to !. (For instance, if the agent deems a number of attributes of the alternatives as relevant for her choice, then Q(!) may be thought of as the set of all alternatives that dominate ! with respect to all attributes.) In line with this interpretation, the condition Q (}) = X posits that "nothing"(i.e., }) does not enhance the appeal of any alternativeit does not attract the agent's attention to any particular set of alternatives.
Given these considerations, we interpret the behavior of a decision-maker in terms of a given reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi on X as follows. For any choice problem S 2 X; the agent either evaluates what to choose in a reference-independent manner, or identi…es a reference point in S and uses this point to …nalize her choice. In the former case we have r(S) = } and Q(r(S)) = X, and hence (1) takes the form c(S) = arg max u(S); in concert with the standard theory of rational choice.
11 In the latter case, r(S) is an alternative in S; say z; and the agent is "mentally attracted" to the elements of S that belong also to Q(z): It is "as if" she faces the mental constraint that her choices from S must belong to Q(z): (See Figure 3. ) (1) says that, within this constraint, then, the agent is fully rational: she solves her problem upon the maximization of u; that is, c(S) = arg max u(S \ Q(z)):
Finally, (2) imposes some consistency between the references and choices of an individual from nested sets. To wit, take a problem S 2 X in which the agent uses a reference point, that is, r(S) 6 = }. Now consider another choice problem T S which contains some of the choices from S (that is, c(S) \ T 6 = ;) as well as the reference used in S (that is, r(S) 2 T ). There does not appear to be a compelling reason for the agent to change her referential assessment in this instance; it seems requiring r(T ) = r(S) is in the nature of things. Yet, while one may choose to impose such a restriction in the case of a speci…c application, this Figure 3 is really not a behavioral assumption -it cannot possibly be deduced from postulates on a given choice correspondence on X: After all, c cannot identify r uniquely. What one can guarantee, however, is the consistency of choices from S and T in this case, and condition (2) does exactly this. That is, when T is nested in S; and both a choice from S and the reference of S remain feasible in T; then, even if a di¤erent reference point could be used in T , the agent's choices would be identical to the ones she would have picked if she used r(S) as the reference point in T: Indeed, if a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi represents c; then (2) ensures that r(S) 2 T S and c(S) \ T 6 = ; imply c(T ) = c(S) \ T
for any S; T 2 X. 
Properties of Reference-Dependent Choice Models
Using the terminology we have introduced in Section 2.2, we now identify various properties of choice correspondences that are represented by reference-dependent choice models. First, we characterize those problems that are rendered "awkward"by such correspondences.
Proposition 2. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi: Then, a choice problem S 2 X is c-awkward if, and only if, c(S) 6 = arg max u(S):
This result shows that the choice behavior induced by a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi deems a given choice problem "awkward"i¤ the choices from that problem are not made solely on the basis of the maximization of the utility function u: Thus, in the context of such a model, "awkwardness" is the same thing as departing from "choice by utility maximization."(The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward, and hence omitted.) 12 Proof. By (2), we have c(T ) = arg max u(T \ Q(r(S))): So, if x 2 c(T ); then we have x 2 Q(r(S)); while by picking any y 2 c(S)\T; and using the representation, we …nd u(x) u(y) u(!) for all ! 2 S \Q(r(S)): Thus, again by the representation, c(T ) c(S) \ T: The converse containment is similarly established.
Given a c-awkward problem S; the representation by hu; r; Qi entails that r(S) 6 = }; that is, in this case, the model designates a reference alternative r(S) in S: We now show that this alternative cannot itself be chosen in S, and it is indeed viewed as a "reference"by c in the sense that r(S) is a revealed c-reference for every choice from S:
Proposition 3. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi: Then, for any c-awkward choice problem S 2 X:
(a) r(S) 2 Snc(S); (b) r(S) is a revealed c-reference for each x 2 c(S).
Proof. Let S be a c-awkward set in X: If r(S) = }; then Q (r(S)) = X; so (1) yields c(S) = arg max u(S); which, in view of Proposition 2, is a contradiction. Thus: r(S) 2 S: Now suppose r(S) 2 c(S): Then, by (3), we have cfx; r(S)g = fx; r(S)g \ c(S) for every x 2 S: As r maps every doubleton to }, therefore, arg max u(fx; r(S)g) = fx; r(S)g \ c(S) for every x 2 S: It follows that c(S) = arg max u(S) which again contradicts c-awkwardness of S. Thus: r(S) 2 Snc(S); and (a) is proved. Now, put z := r(S): By Proposition 2, c(S) 6 = arg max u(S): If y 2 arg max u(S)nc(S); then we pick any x 2 c(S); and use (3) to …nd that y 2 cfx; yg and fx; yg \ cfx; y; zg = fxg: If, on the other hand, there is an x 2 c(S)n arg max u(S); we pick any y 2 arg max u(S); and use (3) to …nd cfx; y; zg = c(S) \ fx; y; zg; which means x 2 cfx; y; zg while fyg = cfx; yg. In all contingencies, then, r(S) is a revealed c-reference for each x, and (b) is proved.
The next observation shows that an individual whose choice behavior is represented by a reference-dependent choice model would always choose an alternative over any revealed reference for that alternative.
Proposition 4. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi: Then, u(z) < u(x) for any x; z 2 X such that z is a revealed c-reference for x: In particular, u(r(S)) < u(x) for any c-awkward S 2 X and x 2 c(S):
Proof. Take any x and z in X such that z is a revealed c-reference for x: Then, there is a y 2 X such that either (i) x 2 cfx; y; zgncfx; yg or (ii) y 2 cfx; yg and fx; yg \ cfx; y; zg = fxg: In either of these cases fx; y; zg is c-awkward, so rfx; y; zg 6 = } by Proposition 2. On the other hand, if either x or y is rfx; y; zg; then (3) readily yields a contradiction. Thus: rfx; y; zg = z: It then follows from Proposition 3.(a) that z = 2 cfx; y; zg; and hence, whether we are in case (i) or (ii), fxg = fx; zg \ cfx; y; zg = cfx; zg: Then u(z) < u(x) by the representation of c; establishing the …rst assertion of the present proposition. Finally, we highlight the connection between reference alternatives and attraction correspondence for choice correspondences that are represented by hu; r; Qi as in Theorem 1.
Proposition 5. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi: Then, for every x; z 2 X:
(a) If z is a revealed c-reference for x; then x 2 Q(z); (b) If x 2 Q(z); then z is a potential c-reference for x:
Proof. Let z be a revealed c-reference for x: Then, as in the proof of Proposition 4, there is a y 2 X such that rfx; y; zg 6 = }: But if rfx; y; zg 2 fx; yg; then (3) entails fx; yg \ cfx; y; zg = cfx; yg; and we obtain a contradiction in both of these cases. Thus, rfx; y; zg = z; and hence, as x 2 cfx; y; zg; the representation ensures that x 2 Q(z): This proves part (a) of the proposition. The proof of part (b) is similar.
In words, Proposition 5 says that every alternative attracts the decision-maker to those items that it is revealed to be a reference for, and conversely, if an alternative happens to attract the agent to a choice prospect x, then that alternative must at least be a potential reference for x:
Reference Dependence and Asymmetric Dominance
A reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi found in Theorem 1 posits hardly any structure on the attraction correspondence Q. We now turn to sharpen that characterization by determining when we can guarantee that the attraction region of each alternative (according to Q) would consist of the options that dominate it in terms of a set of utilities. This is very much in line with the empirical evidence on the attraction e¤ect phenomenon.
The key to this is to strengthen the RCoh property on a given choice correspondence c on X. In particular, consider …nitely many alternatives x 1 ; : : : ; x n (with n 2) such that x 1 is a revealed c-reference for x 2 , x 2 is a revealed c-reference for x 3 , . . . , and x n 1 is a revealed c-reference for x n . In this instance it would be too much to require that x 1 be a revealed reference for x n . After all, it may be the case that the choice of x n may never require the "help" of x 1 for it is already a rather desirable alternative. It stands to reason, however, that x 1 would never "help" an alternative against x n ; this would point to an inconsistency in the way references arise for the decision-maker. Consequently, it makes sense to presume that x 1 must at least be a potential c-reference for x n .
Reference Acyclicity (RA). For any integer n 2 and x 1 ; :::; x n 2 X; if x i is revealed c-reference for x i+1 for each i = 1; :::; n 1, then x 1 is a potential c-reference for x n :
It is plain that RA is stronger than RCoh. Our next result demonstrates how Theorem 1 alters if we replace the latter property with RA.
Theorem 6. A continuous choice correspondence c satis…es No-Cycle, RCon, RA and RI if, and only if, there is a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi on X and a nonempty set U of real maps on X such that hu; r; Qi represents c and Q(z) = fy 2 X : U (y) U (z) for each U 2 Ug; z 2 X:
Consider an individual whose choice correspondence c satis…es the four axioms in Theorem 6. Then, not only her choice behavior can be represented by means of a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi, but we have a speci…c interpretation for the attraction correspondence Q. It is as if the agent were endowed with a collection of utility functions, and in a problem where she discerns a reference point, she were attracted to those options that happen to dominate that reference in terms of each of these utilities. In turn, one may interpret these utilities as measuring the performance of alternatives in X with respect to a certain attribute. According to this interpretation, then, the individual behaves exactly as prescribed by the attraction e¤ect phenomenon: the presence of asymmetrically dominated alternatives (relative to a reference item) attracts her to choose among those options that dominate the reference item. We emphasize, however, that Theorem 6 is more general than the usual presentation of this phenomenon. This theorem obtains endogenously, and on the basis of purely behavioral postulates, not only the reference points of a decision-maker, but also her subjective attributes in terms of which she evaluates the alternatives. (By contrast, the attributes in the classical case of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon are given as part of the description of the problem.) Theorem 6, therefore, identi…es how one can check for the presence of attraction e¤ect in contexts where attributes of the choice prospects are not explicitly given, and provides a choice model that accounts for this e¤ect across any choice domain.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the following scenario. An individual is in an (unusual) restaurant which serves only two dishes, steak tartare and chicken. The individual loves steak tartare, but is cautious about ordering it, because if it is not prepared well and fresh, this dish can have unhealthy consequences. In addition, there seems to be hardly any reason to expect that a restaurant that serves only steak tartare and chicken would be a good place to eat steak tartare at. Thus, she orders the chicken dish. But now consider the alternate scenario in which the same (or some other restaurant unknown to her), the menu consists of steak tartare, chicken and frog legs. The individual does not fancy frog legs in general, but she is well aware that this dish is a delicacy of French cuisine. She thus reasons that steak tartare should be good here, and thus orders the steak tartare. This is one of the classic scenarios in which perfectly reasonable choice behavior leads to a violation of WARP. 13 And at a …rst stroke, it does not seem to be related to the attraction e¤ect phenomenon, because the attributes of dishes in the problem are not speci…ed explicitly, and the behavior is "intuitively" justi…ed by an information-based story. But, if we denote steak tartare by x; chicken by y and frog legs by z; the choice function of the individual maintains simply that cfx; yg = y and cfx; y; zg = x; which is none other than the choicetheoretic description of the attraction e¤ect (Example 1). Theorem 6 thus applies readily to explain this behavior "as if" the agent perceives the dishes in terms of a number of (subjective) attributes, and once she identi…es a reference option (which in this case is frog legs) she is attracted toward dishes that are superior to that option in all attributes.
Remark. When X is …nite, U can be taken as a …nite collection in Theorem 6. As a technical aside, we note that if c is such that "being potential c-reference for"is a transitive relation on X which is continuous in the sense that it is a closed subset of X X; then we could take U in Theorem 6 as a countable collection of continuous real maps on X:
Welfare Analysis
We now brie ‡y discuss how one could perform welfare comparisons for decision-makers whose choice behavior can be represented by a reference-dependent choice model. It is well known that making such welfare comparisons is not a trivial matter when subjects violate WARP, for then the revealed preference criterion fails to give us a consistent ranking across choice problems. We next discuss two criteria that could be used to make such comparisons when the violations of WARP arise due to referential considerations.
Let c be a choice correspondence on X. The …rst criterion, which we shall call the pairwise welfare criterion, is the standard one which regards an individual with choice correspondence c "better o¤" with an alternative x as opposed to another alternative y -we denote this situation by x % c y -if the individual would choose x over y in a pairwise choice problem, that is, x 2 cfx; yg. While this criterion would clearly not be suitable in the case of arbitrary violations of WARP, it is not unreasonable within the present context. Indeed, recall that we focus here only on violations of rationality that are due to reference e¤ects, and such e¤ects are not likely to be pressing in pairwise choice situations. In particular, attraction e¤ect type choice behavior cannot arise in pairwise comparisons of alternatives, which is why our analysis is conducted under the assumption No-Cycle. This, in turn, makes the above welfare ranking a well-de…ned, complete and transitive binary relation on X.
It is plain that if c is a choice correspondence that is represented by a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi on X; then the pairwise welfare criterion is captured by the utility function u; that is, x % c y i¤ u(x) u(y), for every x; y 2 X: In addition, it also follows readily from the representation that this criterion is used by the agent not only in pairwise choice situations, but also when she evaluates options that her reference point renders attractive. Put di¤erently, it is this criterion that the decision-maker uses in the absence of referential considerations, or when comparing options that "survive"the reference e¤ects.
The second welfare criterion provides a more conservative approach toward making welfare comparisons. According to this criterion, we regard an individual with choice correspondence c "better o¤" with an alternative x as opposed to another alternative y -we denote this situation by x B c y -if the individual would never choose y in a choice problem that contains x, that is, y 2 Xnc(S) for every S 2 X with x 2 S: This is the criterion suggested by Bernheim and Rangel (2009) to make welfare comparisons when one's choice behavior violates WARP.
In terms of choice correspondences that admit a representation such as the one given in Theorem 1, the Bernheim-Rangel welfare criterion can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 7. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi: Then, for any x and y in X; the following are equivalent:
(a) x B c y; (b) y = 2 cfx; y; zg for any z 2 X; (c) u(x) > u(y), and rfx; y; zg 6 = z for any z 2 X with u(x) u(z) and x 2 XnQ(z):
Proof. It is immediate that (a) implies (b). Suppose (b) holds. Then, setting z := y in (b) yields fxg = cfx; yg; that is, u(x) > u(y): So, if (c) were false, there would exist a z 2 X such that rfx; y; zg = z; u(x) u(z) and x 2 XnQ(z): But, by the representation of c, we would then have x 2 cfx; zg and x = 2 cfx; y; zg; while by Proposition 3.(a), z = 2 cfx; y; zg; whence cfx; y; zg = fyg; contradicting (b). Conclusion: (b) implies (c). Finally, suppose that there exists an S 2 X such that (x; y) 2 S c(S): By the represention of c this can only happen if either (i) u(y) u(x) or (ii) u(x) > u(y) and x 2 XnQ(r(S)): In case (i), we obviously contradict (c). In case (ii), we have fxg = cfx; yg and x = 2 c(S); so, setting z := r(S) and using (3), we …nd that cfx; y; zg contains y but not x: Thus, rfx; y; zg 6 = }: But if rfx; y; zg is either x or y; (3) yields the contradiction y 2 cfx; yg: Therefore, rfx; y; zg = z; and we again contradict (c). Conclusion: (c) implies (a).
In terms of choice correspondences that admit a representation such as the one given in Theorem 6, we may formulate sharper su¢ cient conditions for the Bernheim-Rangel welfare criterion to apply.
Proposition 8. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi such that (4) holds for some nonempty U R X . Then: (a) x B c y for any x; y 2 X such that u(x) > u(y) and U (x) U (y) for all U 2 U; (b) x B c z for any x; z 2 X such that z is a revealed c-reference for x;
Proof. Part (a) follows readily from the representation and (4). On the other hand, if z is a revealed c-reference for x; then by Proposition 4, we have u(x) > u(z) and U (x) U (z) for all U 2 U; so we may invoke part (a) to obtain (b).
Further Considerations
On Potential Applications
The prevalence of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon in a variety of contexts suggests that reference-dependent choice models may found applications in a diverse set of situations. Especially, in contexts where it makes sense to view the choice objects as possessing multiple attributes relevant for choice (may they be objective or subjective), the two models developed here may be appropriate to use in order to represent individual choice behavior. For instance, in the contexts of investment decisions, such as portfolio choice, and evaluations of sorts of risky prospects, one can use the reference-dependent choice models to investigate the potential implications of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon.
Deeper applications are likely to arise in multi-agent scenarios. For instance, in multidimensional (spatial) voting problems (with commitment) in which there are at least three candidates, it would be interesting to investigate how the equilibrium choice of platforms by the candidates would be a¤ected if it is known that a part of the voters are subject to the attraction e¤ect. This problem can be formally de…ned by using a reference-dependent choice model, but to our knowledge, it has not yet received attention in the literature on political science. Similarly, one may use such a model to study the optimal choices of producers who wish to exploit the attraction e¤ect in a market environment. Indeed, in Ok, Ortoleva and Riella (2011), a particular reference-dependent choice model is used to study the classical Mussa-Rosen product di¤erentiation problem of a monopoly under the hypothesis that a given fraction of the demand side of the market is subject to the attraction e¤ect. 
Caveat: Cumulative Reference-Dependence
The revealed preference theory that we have developed in this paper models the behavior of a decision-maker who may condition her choices from a feasible set on a reference alternative that she may identify in that set. Implicit in this behavior is that one utilizes a single reference option, but not multiple reference alternatives jointly. As we elaborate now, this points to a shortcoming of the choice models characterized in Theorems 1 and 6, as well as to a natural direction that the present work should be extended in future research.
Example 3. Let X := fx; y; z; wg, and consider a choice function c on 2 X nf;g such that cfx; yg = c fy; z; wg = c fx; y; zg = c fx; y; wg = y and cfx; z; wg = c(X) = x. Such a choice function cannot be represented by a reference-dependent choice model -it violates RCon -but there is reason to view it as arising from reference-dependence. The idea is that both z and w are options that "help"x be chosen, but, alone, the reference e¤ect of neither is powerful enough to sway the attention of the decision-maker from y to x in the problems fx; y; zg and fx; y; wg; respectively. However, the cumulative referential e¤ect created by observing the feasibility of both z and w together in the problem X is enough to divert the attention of the individual to x:
Consider again Luce and Rai¤a's example of choice between steak tartare and chicken which was reviewed at the end of Section 3.3. The intuition behind this example suggests that the more delicacies of French cuisine one sees available in the menu of the restaurant, the more con…dent she would feel that the chef there is pro…cient in preparing the steak tartare. Consequently, while the presence of only the frog legs (in addition to steak tartare) may not convince the agent to order steak tartare, the presence of a whole bunch of dishes like foie gras, bouillabaisse, con…t de canard, etc., may well convince her that this is the right place to try the steak tartare. This is the gist of Example 3.
Example 4. Let X := fx; y 1 ; y 2 ; z 1 ; z 2 g, and consider a choice function c on 2 X nf;g such Shum (2007) who also study the Mussa-Rosen model by modeling the consumer preferences in a non-standard manner, namely, by means of using the self-control preferences of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) . that cfx; y 1 ; y 2 ; z 1 g = y 2 ; cfx; y 1 ; y 2 ; z 2 g = y 1 and c(X) := x. Again, such a choice function violates RCon, so it cannot be represented by a reference-dependent choice model. But, intuitively, the violation of WARP by this choice function arises due to reference-dependence. As Figure 4 illustrates, the alternative z 1 may "help" x against y 1 ; and z 2 may "help" x against y 2 ; much in the same spirit with the attraction e¤ect phenomenon. However, z 1 does not eliminate y 2 in the problem fx; y 1 ; y 2 ; z 1 g; and z 2 does not eliminate y 1 in fx; y 1 ; y 2 ; z 2 g; from consideration, so x is not chosen from either of these choice situations. Yet, in the context of the problem X; it seems reasonable that the agent may feel the reference e¤ects of both z 1 and z 2 ; the former diverting attention to x and y 2 ; and the latter to x and y 1 ; and hence the two referential evaluations point jointly to choosing the option x:
These examples suggest that it would be bene…cial to consider extensions of referencedependent choice models that would account for cumulative reference e¤ects. We now outline a way of doing this.
De…nition. A function r: X ! 2 X [ f}g is said to be a multi-reference map on X if, for any S 2 X; we have ; 6 = r(S) S whenever r(S) 6 = }; and r(S) = } whenever jSj 2.
We say that a triplet hu; r; Qi in which u is a continuous real map on X; r is a multireference map on X, and Q : (2 X nf;g) [ f}g X is a correspondence such that Q (}) = X and (2) holds (for every S; T 2 X with r(S) T S and arg max u(S \ Q(r(S))) \ T 6 = ;), is a multi-reference-dependent choice model on X. Such a model is said to represent a choice correspondence c on X if (1) holds for each S 2 X.
Provided that their de…nitions are suitably completed, the choice functions considered in Examples 3 and 4 can be represented by multi-reference-dependent choice models. (In the …rst model we would have r(X) = fz; wg and Qfz; wg = fxg; and in the second model we would set r(X) = fz 1 ; z 2 g and Qfz 1 ; z 2 g = fxg:) However, the notion of a multi-referencedependent choice model is a bit too general in that it allows sets of reference options to be assigned attraction regions essentially arbitrarily. By contrast, Example 3, and especially Example 4, suggest that the reference e¤ect of a collection of options may be regarded as the reference e¤ects of each of these options put together. This leads us to:
De…nition. A multi-reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi on X is said to be a cumulative reference-dependent choice model on X if Q(r(S)) = \ fQfzg : z 2 r(S)g for every S 2 X:
A choice function as in Example 3 (suitably de…ned) can trivially be represented by a cumulative reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi on 2 X nf;g where r(X) = fz; wg and Qfzg = Qfwg = fxg: More interestingly, this model can be used to represent a choice function that is consistent with the choice data of Example 4 by setting r(X) = fz 1 ; z 2 g, Qfz 1 g = fx; y 2 g and Qfz 2 g = fx; y 1 g: Then, the joint e¤ect of z 1 and z 2 is found as Qfz 1 g \ Qfz 2 g = fxg; as illustrated in Figure 4 .
The notion of a cumulative choice model generalizes that of a reference-dependent choice model in the obvious manner. Thus, this model captures the attraction e¤ect phenomenon both in the standard and the cumulative sense. This makes identifying the behavioral basis of choice correspondences that can be represented by such models a interesting project, but one that we have to leave to future research at present.
On the Related Literature
The notion of "reference dependence" has been extensively investigated in economics. Indeed, there is a sizable literature on modeling choice problems for which reference points are exogenously given -such choice problems are special cases of what Rubinstein and Salant (2008) call "problems with frames." Among speci…c examples of choice models with exogneously given references, there are the behavioral (loss aversion) models of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) , and the axiomatic choice models of Chateauneuf and Wakker (1999) , Ok (2005, 2010) , and Diecidue and de Ven (2008) . The Masatlioglu-Ok choice model is closest to the spirit of the present work. (In this model, one's reference point is designated as her (observable) status quo option, and the agent is characterized by a utility function and a nonempty set of utility functions. The agent makes her choices by maximizing her utility over alternatives that are better than the status quo option in terms of all utilities in the latter set with the understanding that she would opt for the status quo if no available option passes this test.)
The main di¤erence between this literature and the present approach toward modeling reference-dependent choice lies in our treatment of "references"as being endogenous to choice problems. The type of choice problems we study here do not come with any preassigned frames; the presence/absence of a reference option for a decision-maker is determined here by observing the choices of the agent across various choice problems very much in the tradition of the revealed preference theory.
To our knowledge, the only other papers that concentrate on the notion of endogenous reference formation are Rabin (2006, 2007) . These papers develop a model in which the agent's reference point is determined as her rational expectations about the outcome she will receive given her behavior, which in turn must be optimal in terms of a classical gain-loss utility function conditional on this reference point. That is, in this model the reference point and the optimal behavior are jointly determined through what is called a "personal equilibrium." This approach, while being quite interesting, di¤er from ours in several aspects, at least two of which are substantial. First, in the Köszegi-Rabin approach one's reference point is really one's beliefs about future returns, and hence it is, at least conceptually speaking, not a choice object. Because this approach models both the choice items and beliefs in terms of lotteries over outcomes, however, such references may or may not belong to a given choice problem (at the time of choice). When they do, they emerge as desirable alternatives; the individual may well choose this object in a choice problem. By contrast, in our model a reference point in a choice problem, if it arises, is an option that is surely feasible in that problem, but one that the agent will never choose (as in the attraction e¤ect); recall Proposition 3.(a). Second, the model of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) coincides with that of rational choice if there is no underlying uncertainty, which means that this model is not suitable to address the instances of reference-dependent behavior like the attraction e¤ect in enviroments in which no uncertainty seems to be present. By contrast, the model presented here allows for uncertainty as a special case, but also addresses reference-dependence with certainty as well.
Also related to the present work are the recent papers that introduce choice models compatible with the attraction e¤ect phenomenon. For instance, de Clippel and Eliaz (2011) axiomatizes a model where the individual's choices are the cooperative solution of a bargaining problem between two preference relations. Depending on the speci…c relations, their model may be consistent with certain instances of the attraction e¤ect (as well as other choice anomalies, such as the compromise e¤ect). Another paper that introduces a choice model for the attraction e¤ect phenomenon is Lombardi (2009). Lombardi's model is of the following form: First, from any choice problem S; the agent selects the elements of S that are maximal according to some acyclic binary relation, and second, she eliminates from the resulting maximal set those alternatives whose lower contour sets are strictly contained in that of some other maximal alternative. A similar model is obtained by Gerasimou (2011) as well; the chosen alternatives in Gerasimou's model are those that are undominated, but that dominate at least one other alternative, in terms of a partial order.
These models do not analyze the attraction e¤ect phenomenon as a consequence of reference-dependent choice. Even more important, any one of these models are compatible with only a "weak" form of this phenomenon. In particular, these models allow for the addition of an asymmetrically dominated option to help the agent decide between two alternatives to which she reveals to be indi¤erent in a pairwise comparison, but none of them allows for this addition to lead the agent to alter her strict ranking of choice items. Put more precisely, all of these models are compatible with the following choice data: cfx; yg = fx; yg and cfx; y; zg = fyg -the introduction of z breaks the indi¤erence between x and y -, but none of them is compatible with the choice data cfx; yg = fxg and cfx; y; zg = fyg -the introduction of z leads the agent to alter her choice from x to y.
15 (In particular, if we specialize these models to the case of choice functions, none of them remain compatible with the attraction e¤ect phenomenon.) This is problematic, for the overwhelming part of the data on the attraction e¤ect is of the latter form (and is in fact presented in terms of choice functions). As we have demonstrated in the body of the paper, the choice models that are developed in this paper are fully compatible with this version of the attraction e¤ect phenomenon, and thus conform with the related empirical evidence. Kamenica (2008) studies a clever model in which there is a market with rational consumers some of whom are informed and some of whom are uninformed, with uninformed consumers exhibiting a behavior in equilibrium that conform with the attraction e¤ect (as well as the compromise e¤ect) phenomenon. In this model, choice anomalies are not seen as violations of "rationality," but they rather emerge as equilibrium behavior in a speci…c market environment. By contrast, in the present paper, we do regard the attraction e¤ect phenomenon as a violation of WARP. This is motivated by the presence of this phenomenon in very di¤erent sorts of economic environments, as well as in laboratory experiments where the informational structure of the environment does not seem to be the source of the problem.
In a nutshell, the choice models developed in this paper have the structure of rational- 15 As an example, let us demonstrate this fact in terms of the model of de Clippel and Eliaz (2011). That model is based on the axiom of Removing an Alternative, which imposes that c(S) 6 = fzg implies c(Snfzg) \ c(S) 6 = ;. For any distinct alternatives x; y and z; this property entails that, when cfx; y; zg = fyg 6 = fzg, we must have cfx; yg \ cfx; y; zg 6 = ;, and hence y 2 cfx; yg.
ization by mentally-constrained optimization, that is, they posit that the decision-maker focus in a given choice situation S only on S \ Q(r(S)); the set of options that dominate the (endogenously determined) reference point. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2011) present a related model in which there are …nitely many alternatives, choice behavior is modeled through choice functions, and subjects focus only on a subset (S) of the choice problem S, …nalizing their choices by maximizing utility over those elements. Their interpretation is that (S) is the subset of the alternatives in S on which the agent focuses her attention. They posit that the self-map on 2 X nf;g is such that (S) = (Snfxg) holds whenever x 2 Sn (S), and refer to any such map as an attention …lter. If we restrict our attention to the case where X is …nite, and work only with a choice function c, then the model characterized in Theorem 1 can be seen as a special case of that model. For, if c is a choice function on 2 X nf;g represented by a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi; then by setting (S) := fc(S)g [ fx 2 X : u(c(S)) > u(x)g; we …nd that is an attention …lter and fc(S)g = arg max u( (S)) for every nonempty S X: However, by contrast to our model, that of Masatlioglu, et al. (2011) is not tailored toward addressing the issue of reference-dependent choice; that model is simply too general to be useful for this purpose; it violates, in general, the properties of No-Cycle, RCoh and RCon altogether.
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The model of Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni (2010) is also built around the idea of a mentally-constrained optimization choice procedure. In that paper, where X is again assumed to be …nite, a pair (%; ) is referred to as a model of behavior when % is a binary relation on X, and a map such that ; 6 = (S) S for all choice problems S. Cherepanov, et al. say that a choice correspondence c is represented by the model of behavior (%; ) if, for every choice problem S, c(S) is the set of the alternatives that maximize % in (S). In turn, Cherepanov, et al. (2010) provides an axiomatic foundation for the case in which is induced by a collection of rationales (binary relations on X) in the sense that, for each choice problem S, (S) is found as the set of elements of S that are maximal with respect to at least one of the rationales in . Our reference-dependent choice model is clearly related to this representation. In fact, if c is a choice correspondence on 2 X nf;g that is represented by a reference-dependent choice model hu; r; Qi; there is a natural way of de…ning a model of behavior (%; ), where % is the preference relation on X that is represented by u, and (S) := Q(r(S)) for each choice problem S. However, in general, our model and that of Cherepanov, et al. (2010) are not nested. On the one hand, there are instances that are allowed by their model but not by ours -like cycles that may emanate from pairwise choice situations. On the other hand, it is in general not true that the map S 7 ! Q(r(S)) is induced by a set of rationales; in fact, the Cherepanov-Feddersen-Sandroni model violates, in general, both RCoh and RCon. 17 Finally, we recall that our representation of a choice correspondence is built on a two-stage decision making procedure: in the …rst stage the decision-maker eliminates all alternatives 16 Lleras et al. (2010) study a related choice model where the de…ning property of the map is that x 2 (S) implies x 2 (T ) for every T S with x 2 T . Simple examples would show that the resulting choice model and that of Theorem 1 are not nested.
17 Let X := fx; y; z; wg, and consider the choice function c on 2 X nf;g de…ned by cfx; yg = cfx; zg = cfx; wg = cfx; y; zg = c fx; z; wg := x, cfy; zg = c fy; wg = c fx; y; wg = c fy; z; wg := y, c fz; wg := z and c(X) := x. This function cannot be represented as in the Cherepanov-Feddersen-Sandroni model, but it can be represented by a reference-dependent choice model. that are not highlighted by the reference point, and in the second stage she selects the alternatives that yield the highest utility among the highlighted ones. There are other papers that have investigated such sequential decision making procedures. For example, Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Rubinstein and Salant (2006) axiomatize choice functions that can be represented as if the agent applies two binary relations, one after the other: 18 …rst, she eliminates all elements in a problem that are not maximal relative to the …rst relation, and second, among the remaining elements chooses that which is optimal according to the second relation. The connection between these models and ours is not tight, however. Both of these models are primed to capture cycles that may emanate in pairwise choice situations. By No-Cycle, we rule out such violations of WARP, while it is known that either of these models reduce to the standard rational choice model if they were to satisfy No-Cycle. Put di¤erently, the intersection of the class of choice correspondences that we have characterized here and those of Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Rubinstein and Salant (2006) contains only the classical rational choice model (for choice functions).
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We begin with a preliminary observation. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that satis…es RCon, and take any c-awkward S 2 X. Let T S stand for the collection of all T in X \ 2 S such that c(S) \ T 6 = ; and c(T ) 6 = c(S) \ T: As S is c-awkward, T S 6 = ;: Besides, if S = S fT : T 2 T S g; then T S is a c-cover of S; so by RCon, there is a T 2 T with c(T ) = c(S) \ T; which is impossible in view of the de…nition of T S : It follows that S fT : T 2 T S g is a proper subset of S; that is, there is some z 2 S such that c(T ) = c(S) \ T for all T 2 X \ 2 S with c(S) \ T 6 = ; and z 2 T . We have proved the "only if" part of the following characterization, whose "if" part is straightforward.
Lemma A.1. Let c be a choice correspondence on X: Then, c satis…es RCon if, and only if, for any c-awkward set S in X, there exists a z 2 S such that c (T ) = c (S) \ T for all T 2 X \ 2 S with c (S) \ T 6 = ; and z 2 T:
We now move to the proof of Theorem 1.
[Necessity] Let c be a continuous choice correspondence on X which is represented by a referencedependent choice model hu; r; Qi on X. It readily follows from this representation that, for any x; y 2 X, we have x 2 cfx; yg i¤ u (x) u (y). It is also plain that u(x) = u(y) for any x; y 2 X with fx; yg c(S) for some S 2 X. Thus c satis…es No-Cycle and RI. On the other hand, Proposition 5 entails that c satis…es RCoh. Finally, suppose S is a c-awkward set in X. By Proposition 2, this implies r(S) 6 = }. Put z := r(S); and notice that the representation and (2) entail that c (T ) = c (S) \ T for all T 2 X \ 2 S with c (S) \ T 6 = ; and z 2 T: In view of the arbitrariness of S and Lemma A.1, therefore, we may conclude that c satis…es RCon.
[Su¢ ciency] Suppose that c is a continuous choice correspondence on X that satis…es the four axioms in the statement of the theorem. De…ne the binary relation % X X by x % y i¤ x 2 cfx; yg. Since c is a continuous choice correspondence that satis…es No-Cycle, % is a complete and continuous preorder on X. Given that X is a separable metric space, therefore, we may invoke Debreu's Utility Representation Theorem to …nd a continuous function u : X ! R such that x % y i¤ u(x) u(y) for every x; y 2 X. This implies cfx; yg = arg max u(fx; yg) for every x; y 2 X.
A.3 Independence of the Axioms
In this section we show the axioms that we imposed in Theorems 1 and 6 are independent.
Example A.1. Let X := fx; y; zg, and consider the choice function c on 2 X nf;g de…ned by cfx; yg := x, cfy; zg := y, cfx; zg := z and c(X) := x. Clearly, c violates No-Cycle, but it satis…es RCon and RI. The only revealed c-reference here is y, which is a revealed c-reference for x. It follows that c satis…es RA (and hence RCoh) as well.
Example A.2. Let X := fx; y; z; wg, and consider the choice function c on 2 X nf;g de…ned by cfx; yg = cfx; zg = cfx; wg = cfx; y; zg = cfx; y; wg = cfx; z; wg := x, cfy; zg = cfy; wg = cfy; z; wg := y, and cfz; wg = c(X) := z. It is easy to see that c satis…es No-Cycle and RI. Also, there is no revealed c-reference in this example, so c also satis…es RA (and hence RCoh). On the other hand, c violates RCon. For instance, T := ffx; zg; fy; z; wgg is a c-cover of X; but we have c(X) \ T 6 = c(T ) for each T 2 T : Example A.3. Let X := fx; y; z; wg, and consider the choice function c on 2 X nf;g de…ned by cfx; yg = cfx; zg = cfx; wg = cfx; y; zg := x, cfy; zg = c fy; wg = c fx; y; wg := y, c fz; wg = c fx; z; wg = c fy; z; wg := z and c(X) := z. It is easy to check that c satis…es No-Cycle, RCon and RI. On the other hand, w is a revealed c-reference for y, but w is not a potential c-reference for y (because cfy; zg = y and yet c fy; z; wg = z): Thus, c violates RCoh (and hence RA).
Example A.4. Let X := fx; y; zg, and consider the choice correspondence c on 2 X nf;g de…ned by cfx; yg = cfx; zg := fxg; cfy; zg := fyg; and c(X) := fx; yg. It is plain that c satis…es No-Cycle but not RI. On the other hand, the only revealed c-reference here is z which is a revealed c-reference for y. It follows that c satis…es RA (and hence RCoh). It is also easily checked that c satis…es RCon.
